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PREFACE 
Labor unions across the global North are struggling to improve pay 
and working conditions in expanding service sector industries. This is by 
no means an easy task. The workplaces of the new economy remain poorly 
organized. Even in European countries known for their corporatist politi-
cal traditions, politicians are designing new legislation intended to break 
the grip of strong labor laws and employment protections on a stagnant 
economy. Worker representatives find their role in national policymaking 
and in corporate decision making weakened at a time when more insecure, 
lower-paid jobs are expanding. 
This book is about the role that labor unions can and should play in 
modern service workplaces. Its central motivating question is whether 
strong and cooperative industrial relations institutions characteristic of so-
cial Europe have the potential to give service workers similar benefits to 
those achieved in the golden age of postwar manufacturing: productive 
and stable employment characterized by high job quality and low wage 
inequality. Past academic and policy debates on the relationship between 
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national institutions, management strategies, and worker outcomes have 
focused overwhelmingly on large export-oriented sectors such as the 
global auto industry. Institutions in most service industries look a lot less 
coherent than those described in these accounts. Union membership and 
works council presence are much lower in services than in manufacturing. 
Service workers are also less likely to be covered by a union contract or to 
have traditional occupational training, and their jobs tend to be lower paid 
and less secure. 
As these poorly regulated service jobs become more typical of where 
Americans and Europeans work, the questions comparative researchers 
asked in auto assembly plants and steel mills need to be revisited. Is there 
an inevitable convergence on one "best practice" employment model, as 
managers adjust to competition unfettered by laws or unions? Or does 
context matter, even in more peripheral workplaces: Do different laws and 
collective bargaining arrangements make a difference for management 
strategies and employee outcomes? What influence do these strategies 
have, in turn, on the strength and coverage of collective bargaining? These 
questions are at the heart of debates over the future of work and worker 
welfare in increasingly interconnected, postindustrial economies. 
I attempt to answer these questions here through the lens of a com-
parative study carried out in U.S. and German call centers. The analysis 
looks at how unions and works councils have shaped employer strategies 
to restructure these easily rationalized service jobs, and how these strat-
egies have in turn refashioned industrial relations institutions. My focus 
is on industrial relations rather than other institutions, such as vocational 
training or corporate governance. While collective bargaining is only one 
part of broader systems of rules and incentives at the national level, it is 
unique in regulating the balance of power in the workplace and in laying 
out the conditions under which employees can participate in management 
decision making. Empirical findings are drawn largely from two indus-
try sectors: telecommunications, which continues to have strong unions in 
many countries, and the third-party call center industry, which is a newer 
sector made up of firms with weaker or no unions that often perform sub-
contracted call center work for telecommunications firms. In both sectors, 
I examine the changes that occurred in the organization of call center jobs 
during the 1990s and 2000s, following the liberalization of U.S. and Ger-
man telecommunications markets. 
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Call centers are in many ways the ideal setting for examining how insti-
tutions affect management strategy and worker outcomes in postindustrial 
economies. They are among the most highly mobile of service workplaces, 
with jobs that are increasingly easy to outsource and that are often viewed as 
peripheral to firms' "core competencies." In many countries, government-
driven liberalization of service markets has increased pressure on manag-
ers to cut labor costs for these jobs. For all of these reasons, call centers are 
workplaces where we might most expect to see convergence on weak col-
lective bargaining institutions and a management model based on reducing 
costs rather than investing in job quality. For these same reasons, they are a 
good place to look for the causes of past and continued divergence in man-
agement strategy and worker outcomes. 
The dynamics of growing competition, organizational restructuring, 
and erosion of industry-level bargaining are hardly unique to call cen-
ters. In this sense, they are typical of a range of easily rationalized jobs 
in growing, poorly regulated industries. If unions can make a difference 
for management strategy in these workplaces, there is strong evidence for 
the continued relevance of national industrial relations institutions in the 
regulation of employment. Evidence of their failure to improve or main-
tain working conditions likewise suggests the need for more careful study 
of the causes of these failures and their labor market consequences. 
During my field research in the United States and Germany, I observed 
a number of differences in how call centers were managed. German call 
center agents generally were paid higher salaries and had more control 
over their work than those in the United States. They were more likely 
to be treated like professionals, with flexible schedules and rules that pro-
tected them from the kind of invasive electronic monitoring that was com-
mon in U.S. centers. However, the most striking differences concerned 
the process of management decision making, and the effects that this 
had on employment practices. In Germany, independent works councils 
participated in democratic consultation and negotiation over these deci-
sions. Worker representatives used their strong participation rights to help 
managers find compromise solutions that reduced costs and improved 
productivity and service quality, while ensuring that the privacy, dignity, 
and economic interests of the workforce were respected. Meanwhile, U.S. 
unions struggled to enforce the limited terms of the collective agreements 
that they were able to negotiate, against an often hostile management. 
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Where unions were not present, pressures to cut costs and the easy fix of 
new technologies seemed to leave managers with little choice but to inten-
sify monitoring and discipline on a low-wage, high-turnover workforce. 
The different practices and outcomes in these workplaces could thus be 
more or less directly traced to institutions that gave worker representatives 
widely diverging participation rights and bargaining power. German co-
determination rights, exercised by strong and independent works councils, 
proved to be a crucial support for alternative, high-involvement employ-
ment systems—even in easily rationalized service jobs. Put another way, 
strong institutional supports for workplace democracy pushed call center 
managers to take the high road in workplaces where there were many in-
centives to reduce pay and rationalize work. 
At the same time, I also found that worker representatives were fac-
ing formidable challenges to maintaining these institutions. In both the 
United States and Germany, the number of call center jobs in workplaces 
with strong unions was shrinking. Market liberalization and technologi-
cal change meant that telecommunications employers faced growing price 
competition in increasingly volatile markets. They responded by develop-
ing similar organizational strategies that downgraded pay and working 
conditions through moving work to subcontractors and subsidiaries. Em-
ployers then renegotiated pay at lower levels or simply shifted calls whole-
sale to companies with weaker collective agreements. These trends were 
weakening coordinated collective bargaining and undermining unions' 
and works councils' bargaining power. 
Based on these findings, I argue that institutional supports for work-
place democracy and for the maintenance or extension of encompassing 
collective bargaining are essential for encouraging high-road practices 
where there are strong countervailing pressures to cut costs. Managers 
have a range of different incentives to invest in skills and employee discre-
tion in workplaces servicing value-added market segments. In the service 
workplaces studied here, variation in the ability of workers to participate 
substantively in management decisions was a critical factor explaining 
why some call centers adopted high-involvement employment systems 
and others did not. This ability to participate in democratic arrangements 
depended, in turn, on legal participation rights and bargaining structures, 
which influenced worker representatives' countervailing power in nego-
tiations with management. 
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One objective in this book is to bring this political dimension of man-
agement strategy and practice back to the center of debates over contempo-
rary change in national models. Comparative theorists often treat strategy 
and institutions as coherent bundles or systems. Taylorism, diversified 
quality production, and high performance work systems are by now well-
known ideal type production models. They have most often been studied 
for their promise to improve firm performance, albeit through more or less 
worker-friendly practices. Analyses of hybridization of these models de-
scribe the mechanisms through which institutional change occurs based on 
increasingly complex categories of complementary institutions and their 
relationship with firms' strategic choices. 
This focus on firm strategies in much of the comparative literature ne-
glects the negotiations and conflicts that accompany changes in work or-
ganization, as well as their concrete effects—in the short term, on pay and 
working conditions; and in the longer term on bargaining power and in-
stitutions. While worker participation undeniably can produce benefits for 
firms, it has also traditionally been resisted by managers seeking to reduce 
costs or expand their own scope to implement new strategies unilaterally. 
An important question is under what conditions worker representatives 
are able to encourage qualitatively different employment models that pro-
duce some possibility of "mutual gains," in settings where their own power 
or scope for maneuver is changing. To answer this question, it is necessary 
to take a closer look at how negotiations over restructuring play out in 
those firms and workplaces that face the most intense pressures to rational-
ize jobs and lower wages. By unbundling strategy, institutions also begin to 
look more like heterogeneous resources that unions can draw on to effect 
meaningful changes in pay and working conditions. 
A further objective is to more closely examine the social costs of market 
liberalization, or what is lost as collective bargaining becomes increasingly 
disorganized and as unions lose power and influence. In the past, the social 
market countries of continental Europe were held up as representing an 
alternative model to free market or liberal capitalism, with political and 
economic institutions that ensured the benefits of economic growth were 
more broadly distributed. Strong labor market regulations and powerful 
labor unions encouraged employers to invest in high wages and worker 
skills, while supporting competitive advantage in more value-added seg-
ments of global markets. Labor unions in Europe played a leading role in 
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promoting quality of working life as a central principle in work design, 
encouraging managers to invest in expanded job discretion and worker 
participation at a time when similar U.S. companies were cutting costs and 
downsizing. 
Today, inequality is also on the rise in social Europe. Governments 
are deregulating their labor markets to encourage job growth and unions 
are declining in power and influence. Germany was long the best-practice 
case of a national economy that managed to compete in global markets 
on the basis of well-engineered, quality products, while distributing the 
benefits of value-added production more broadly across the workforce. In 
contemporary Germany, wages are stagnating and low-wage and precari-
ous forms of employment have increased, while firms are reorienting their 
strategies to better pursue shareholder value. 
This book draws on the experiences of the individuals and organiza-
tions who are both driving institutional change and experiencing the costs 
of more flexible labor markets, changing organizational boundaries, and 
weakened unions. The accounts of the workers, managers, works coun-
cilors, and union representatives interviewed in the course of this study 
give insights into the social and strategic advantages of the kind of work-
place democracy that was (and to some degree still is) characteristic of the 
textbook "German Model." Strong codetermination institutions support 
deliberation over the goals and practices that firms adopt when faced with 
similar market challenges. In the cases presented here, these institutions 
gave works councils the tools to propose and enforce alternatives to ra-
tionalization and intensified monitoring. The loss of this power has had 
devastating consequences for employees and has created new kinds of 
management problems for their employers. A closer examination of the 
politics of restructuring helps us better understand these consequences and 
their causes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Dore begins his book British Factory, Japanese Factory with the 
statement, "Factories look very much alike anywhere. . ." One could easily 
make the same observation about call centers, often described as the as-
sembly lines of the information age.' Call center agents use the same tools 
regardless of what country they are in or task they are performing: a head-
set, a computer, perhaps reference files and a list of phone numbers. Most 
call centers are located in large rooms divided into many small cubicles, 
with slightly larger desks or offices for team leaders and managers. Signs 
of varying degrees of sophistication, perhaps centrally located, perhaps on 
the bottom of each agent's computer screen, flash the number of customers 
on hold. The technology behind these white collar factories is becoming 
close to identical, as consultants and suppliers sell common platforms for 
predicting call volumes, routing calls to different agents and centers, and 
developing scheduling plans. 
However, seemingly identical call center workplaces can be entirely 
different kinds of places to work. Managers use a range of approaches to 
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organize these jobs and to motivate employees to sell an ever-expanding 
number of products while still providing efficient (yet high-quality) cus-
tomer service. The service companies that operate call centers experiment 
with performance incentives, different ways of splitting up tasks, and 
team-based or individualized models of work organization. Some call cen-
ters rely heavily on electronic monitoring systems that record every key 
stroke and conversation, while others use more personalized side-by-side 
coaching. In the course of my research for this book, I interviewed highly 
skilled call center agents who had been in their jobs for twenty years, were 
making solid middle-class salaries, and took a great deal of pride in their 
work. I also met a good share of low-paid and overworked employees 
who felt they were trapped in dead-end jobs with little control over their 
day-to-day work. 
The present study attempts to make sense of these differences through 
asking how national and workplace institutions influence management 
choices in what seem at first glance to be uniformly lower-skilled and easily 
rationalized service jobs. Under what conditions will employers adopt high-
road, or "high-involvement," employment models in workplaces where there 
are strong pressures to cut labor costs? Is there evidence of cross-national di-
vergence in these models—and if so, what explains these differences? 
Matched case studies of call center workplaces in the United States and 
Germany provide a first look at the experiences of worker representatives 
in both countries as they have sought to shape management strategies at 
the workplace and organizational levels. The first pair illustrates contrast-
ing outcomes from negotiations over work reorganization in two large 
telecommunication firms. The second shows the increasingly similar chal-
lenges unions experience in both countries as a result of the outsourcing 
strategies adopted by those same firms. 
T h e Diverging Politics of Work Reorganization 
A manager steered me through his service and sales call center at a brisk 
pace, apologizing for the chaos. I was visiting a former regional Bell com-
pany, which had been part of the U.S. monopoly AT&T/Bell system be-
fore divestiture and deregulation in the 1980s. The company was in the 
midst of restructuring its call center jobs, in response to recent regulatory 
changes that had 
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changes that had opened up their regional market to competition— 
putting pressure on management to cut costs. 
That day the company was sponsoring an "international party" to pro-
mote international long-distance plans. The large open-plan rooms were 
decked with streamers and balloons, and supervisors milled around in 
Hawaiian leis, grass skirts, and African headdresses. Each team had made 
food and decorated its set of cubicles to represent a different country, giv-
ing an eerily festive sheen to an otherwise cavernous white room. The 
center managers were in the process of judging the teams based on their 
costumes and level of participation, which seemed to roughly translate 
into the number of team members who had shown the proper amount 
of enthusiasm in preparing for the competition. They could expect a ma-
terial payoff for demonstrating that extra team spirit: the members of 
the winning team would gain points toward their monthly sales bonus, 
with the tie breaker going to the team that sold the most international 
long-distance plans. 
A perky team leader told me about the many exciting changes they had 
put in place in the last few years: "We're really much more about sales 
now. And that means I have to always come up with new ways to moti-
vate my team." She held up some plastic hands, and showed me how you 
could shake them together to make a clapping sound "to show employees 
we appreciate them, that they're doing a great job." As we were talking, 
one of the center leaders came around to take a team photo. The agents 
reluctantly got up from their desks and grimaced at the camera as the team 
leader tried to egg them on: "Come on, smile! Don't look so gloomy, this is 
a party!" "Honestly," she confided later, "the employees we get today just 
aren't what they used to be. In my day, we were motivated by doing the job 
well. Now these kids just come in to make some money, and are out the 
door next week." 
Along with building team spirit and rewarding sales, managers were 
trying to enforce stricter rules on this more difficult-to-motivate work-
force. The company had just adopted a new monitoring policy to catch 
fraud as employees racked up huge bonuses selling products that custom-
ers never ordered. Those who did not make their sales targets were put on 
progressive discipline, and dismissals for poor performance had skyrock-
eted. The company had also started hiring private investigators to catch 
employees who were taking unfair advantage of paid sick leave. "When 
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employees see a supervisor come out to a desk with a buggy and empty out 
that desk, they might think twice next time." 
Union representatives complained that these policies combining tough 
discipline and individual sales incentives were undermining their work. 
They were processing a constant stream of grievances against unfair dis-
missals and several attempts at partnership had fallen flat. Moreover, this 
new high turnover, sales-focused workforce was proving to be difficult to 
convince to get active in the union. Union representatives felt their ability 
to influence management decisions or protect workers was restricted to 
filing grievances, along with regular fights during formal bargaining to 
keep in place some negotiated rules about how and when managers could 
monitor performance or change schedules. 
"Team spirit" was also the buzzword among managers and team lead-
ers at Deutsche Telekom's service and sales centers. Deutsche Telekom was 
seeking to adjust to growing competition in Germany's fixed-line markets, 
where they had only recently lost their monopoly. As at the regional Bell, 
these changes were accompanied by new pressures to cut costs and com-
pete for customers. "Sales offensives" and competitions had become just 
as much a part of their new culture. Large posters announced how many 
DSL and long-distance packages teams had sold each day, and how far 
they had to go to meet their goal for the week. "Employees can add a mark 
when they sell something—that helps build team solidarity, gives them 
the feeling they're moving toward something." The company sponsored 
special win-back offensives, with prizes or bonuses for the winning team. 
Team leaders admitted they had gotten the competitive bug as well: "I look 
and see, ah, this week I'm number three, and last week I was number ten 
in the rankings, good job!" 
Also similar to their counterparts at the former regional Bell, Deutsche 
Telekom's managers were seeking to transform the culture in their call 
centers, trying to encourage workers to move from their traditional focus 
on customer service to more of a sales orientation. They had introduced 
performance-based pay, were teaching selling techniques, and had set up 
competitions and prizes. Still, call centers belonging to the two compa-
nies looked completely different. There were no clappers, balloons, or 
streamers at Deutsche Telekom. Employees dressed more professionally 
and tended to be older, making it difficult to tell the team leaders from 
the agents. Team leaders discussed their employees respectfully, instead 
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of like a parent explaining the challenges of disciplining unruly children. 
"It is impossible to do this job without the trust of your team. They have 
a certain expectation of us as well: that we will help them to develop, that 
we will give them some room to use their skills and not look over their 
shoulder every minute." 
Scratch beneath the surface and these differences widen. While the for-
mer regional Bell made heavy use of individual bonuses, all sales incen-
tives at Deutsche Telekom were group based. While the U.S. managers 
constantly monitored their employees, Deutsche Telekom managers had 
to rely on "mystery calls" to evaluate service quality and could only report 
results at the team level. Most striking was how much more control em-
ployees had over their work and working time. Disciplining agents for 
poor performance was extremely difficult, break times were flexible, and 
"working time accounts" meant employees could take time off when they 
needed it within certain negotiated boundaries. A joint labor-management 
committee decided on sales goals, and employees could formally challenge 
these goals if they believed they were unfair. There was also practically no 
turnover and minimal fraud. 
The Company Principles hung on every wall announcing Deutsche 
Telekom's goal to match customer orientation and professional service: 
(1) Quality of life in an open information community; (2) We impress cus-
tomers through innovative solutions and individual service. In one room, 
a team leader had put up a Goethe quote: "Es hort doch jeder nur, was er 
versteht" (Each hears only what he understands). In addition to regular 
training on selling techniques and product updates, employees and super-
visors attended special seminars at the company's training centers to de-
velop "professional competence." 
At one point during a site visit, I was standing in the hall with a group 
of call center agents on a smoke break. I listened to their complaints about 
the new competitions and incentives, growing pressure to make sales goals, 
constant reorganization in the company, and downsizing. As in many 
of my visits to German call centers, the employees were curious about 
whether I observed any differences in the United States. "What is it like 
there? Aren't all call centers the same?" I told them that supervisors could 
listen to agents without their knowledge and fire them for poor perfor-
mance. Several mouths dropped open. "How can they work under those 
conditions? Aren't they afraid all the time? Does the works council just let 
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that happen?" And then I explained that there are no works councils in 
the United States and that unions do not have the legal right to block re-
mote monitoring or decide on the appropriate criteria for evaluating per-
formance. This was a revelation for them: workers in the United States did 
not have codetermination rights even where they had a union. They con-
ceded that while they may have troubles, conditions were probably worse 
for their American colleagues. 
The Converging Politics of Organizational Restructuring 
Upstate New York experienced deindustrialization in the 1970s but is 
still dealing with the problems associated with job loss and social dis-
location. Abandoned factories line the roads and waterfronts in many 
cities and unemployment is persistently high. Buffalo has gone through 
changes typical of the region. As employment shifted to services, union 
density and per capita earnings declined. Call centers moved in to take 
advantage of attractive government subsidies and a large potential pool 
of workers. 
One of Buffalo's large call center subcontractors, Telespectrum, won 
a contract in the late 1990s to handle DSL sales and customer service for 
Verizon. Verizon is a "legacy" telecommunications firm coming out of the 
former AT&T and regional Bell monopoly, with a long history of collective 
agreements with the Communication Workers of America (CWA) and 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). The unions 
had been trying to halt or reverse outsourcing at Verizon for years with 
some limited success but had no wins from organizing campaigns in its 
subcontractors. The conventional wisdom held that these companies were 
impossible to organize, as it was too easy to intimidate the workforce with 
threats of moving call center jobs to another center or region. Union repre-
sentatives and workers with any experience trying to organize call centers 
repeated one phrase like a mantra: "It's just a matter of flipping a switch, 
then those jobs are gone." 
However, it seemed like they might have a chance at Telespectrum. 
The IBEW had a number of unemployed members in Buffalo who were 
willing to take jobs and organize the workforce at the subcontractor, and 
the union thought it could use its leverage at Verizon to put pressure 
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on management. These union activists organized an election and won 
union recognition in 2000—the first successful organizing campaign 
at a U.S.-based call center subcontractor. After fourteen months of dif-
ficult negotiations, management agreed to a contract that raised pay 
14 percent, from $8.75 to $10. Although this was still less than half of 
the average salary in the company's unionized call centers, it was sub-
stantially higher than the typical wage for subcontracted jobs. However, 
three months later, Verizon withdrew its contract with the company and 
moved the work to several nonunion subcontractors in southern "right 
to work" states. The call center closed, and three hundred employees 
lost their jobs. 
A similar chain of events unfolded in Siegen, a small city in the Ger-
man state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, which is the historic center of West 
German manufacturing. Like many cities in the region, Siegen has shed 
population over the past decade due to the decline of the steel industry, 
and has been steadily losing its remaining manufacturing jobs. Aban-
doned factories line the main highway through town, and unemployment 
fluctuates around 10 percent. Similar to Buffalo, the local government 
sought to attract call centers as part of more service sector—focused eco-
nomic development strategies. In 1999 T-Online, a subsidiary of Deutsche 
Telekom, set up a technical support call center in Siegen. The company 
was attracted to the region by generous training subsidies and relocation 
assistance, and management easily recruited a skilled workforce for the 
new, high-paying jobs. The company's central works council helped to 
coordinate elections for a local works council, which established a good 
working relationship with management. In line with the policies across 
T-Online, the works council negotiated team-based incentives, strict lim-
its on management's ability to remotely monitor calls, and regular pay 
increases. 
After several years, T-Online sold this center to the U.S.-based subcon-
tractor Sykes as part of a plan to outsource the majority of its call center 
work. The new company retained the existing workforce, who kept the 
terms of their former contracts for eighteen months. However, toward 
the end of that period, management gradually introduced individual 
performance-based pay and flexible scheduling. New employees were hired 
on short-term contracts, at two-thirds the pay of tenured agents. While 
agents continued to handle the same kinds of calls, they were expected 
